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IMPLEMENTING HIGH FREQUENCY
TRADING REGULATION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT REFORMS
Michael Morelli*
Technological developments in securities markets, most notably high
frequency trading, have fundamentally changed the structure and nature of
trading over the past fifty years.  Policymakers, both domestically and
abroad, now face many new challenges influencing the secondary market’s
effectiveness as a generator of economic growth and stability. Faced with
these rapid structural changes, many are quick to denounce high frequency
trading as opportunistic and parasitic.  This article, however, instead argues
that while high frequency trading presents certain general risks to secon-
dary market efficiency, liquidity, stability, and integrity, the practice en-
compasses a wide variety of strategies, many of which can enhance, not
inhibit, the secondary trading market’s core goals.
This article proposes a regulatory model aimed at maximizing high fre-
quency trading’s beneficial effects on secondary market functions.  The
model’s foundation, however, requires information.  By analyzing more
data on how high frequency traders interact with markets, regulators can
assess the viability and scope of other potentially worthwhile measures
targeting more general market threats.  Likewise, regulators can determine
who is in the best position to bear supervisory responsibility for particular
trading activities: agencies, exchanges, traders, or some combination
thereof. Crucially, the model also calls on regulators to share information
on a global scale: trading no longer only affects a single exchange, a single
asset class, or even a single country. By sharing information, regulators can
enact more informed regulations, stabilize secondary markets, and mini-
mize regulatory arbitrage.  In short, high frequency trading can be a force
for good, but a principled and coordinated effort is needed to ensure it
fulfills that potential.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
I. HFT REGULATION GOING FORWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
A. Measures Addressing Price Accuracy and Efficiency
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
1. Minimum Resting Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
2. Minimum Order-to-Execution Ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
3. Frequent and On-Demand Batch Auctions . . . . . . 205
* The author graduated from Villanova University in 2011 and Harvard Law School
in 2016.  He is currently a Judicial Law Clerk for the Honorable Norman H. Stahl of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.  He would like to thank Katie Acosta,
Marc Chiaramonte, Matthew Horstmann, and Professor Howell Jackson for their
encouragement, support, and feedback.  He would also like to thank the editors at the
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review for their hard work, patience, and
dedication.  However, the views expressed in this article by the author are in his personal
capacity and are solely his own.
201
202 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 6:201
B. Measures Addressing Liquidity and Volatility Issues . 209
1. Financial Transaction Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
2. Small-Cap Tick Size Pilot Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
3. Market-Making Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
4. Dynamic Maker-Taker Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
C. Measures Addressing Market Stability Issues . . . . . . . . . 215
1. Anti-Disruptive Trading Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
2. Order Message Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
3. HFT Registration and Disclosure Requirements . 220
D. Measures Addressing Investor Protection Issues . . . . . . 222
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF REGULATORY COORDINATION . . . . 226
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
INTRODUCTION
This is the second comment in a two-part series offering a comprehen-
sive approach for regulating secondary markets at a time when trading is
getting faster and faster but spreads are getting narrower and narrower.
The first comment summarized how secondary markets are currently
structured, how many high frequency trading (HFT) strategies currently
operate, and how regulators should go about thinking about the issues
those strategies cause.1  This comment expands on the first by offering
critical analyses of current initiatives regulators are now considering which
target many of those issues.  As the reader shall see, the comment argues
that many of these initiatives, though theoretically sound, will not succeed
absent some level of domestic and international regulatory coordination.
I. HFT REGULATION GOING FORWARD
The landscape surrounding HFT is unsettled.  Global regulators have
enacted, proposed, or considered a wide range of measures targeting sev-
eral of the problems discussed in the previous article, with more now
under consideration.  This section describes several of the measures in-
depth, identifying whether they adequately address HFT-related issues
and recommending which ones policymakers should keep, adopt, alter, or
discard going forward.
A. Measures Addressing Price Accuracy and Efficiency Issues
Any plan to regulate HFT must encourage those strategies that pro-
mote effective price discovery and discourage those that do not.  As a
starting point, HFT strategies primarily relying on market orders will im-
pute more information into securities’ prices compared to those primarily
relying on limit orders.  Nonetheless, HFT strategies that heavily rely on
market orders may damage the market in other ways, such as by trading
1. Michael Morelli, Regulating Secondary Markets in the High Frequency Age: A
Principled and Coordinated Approach, 6 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 101
(2016).
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against standing limit orders and decreasing overall liquidity levels.  Ac-
cordingly, any solution needs to maximize the market order’s inherent
benefits while minimizing its potential costs, thus ensuring that securities
trading remains based on fundamentals-based analysis rather than pure
speed.  Put another way, HFT strategies that discourage other market par-
ticipants from generating and acting on new information should be dis-
couraged, while those boosting such investment should be encouraged.
1. Minimum Resting Times
Minimum resting times specify the time that a limit order must remain
in force.  Theoretically, these delays increase the likelihood that a quote
viewed by a market participant is available for a trade and provide better
estimates of current market prices.  Similarly, by making the limit order
more risky from an adverse selection standpoint, minimum resting times
reduce the profitability of manipulative HFT strategies while simultane-
ously incentivizing HFT firms to submit orders reflecting more fundamen-
tals-based information.  Mary Jo White, Chair of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) from April 2013 to January 2017, had ex-
pressed, in her official capacity, qualified support for minimum resting
times, arguing they would curb the excessive use of canceled orders by
HFT firms.2
The broadness of these proposals present certain dangers.  Professors
Merritt Fox, Lawrence Glosten, and Gabriel Rauterberg for instance,
chastise minimum resting times for ignoring the many legitimate reasons
why HFT strategies rapidly cancel orders beyond electronic front run-
ning.3  Beyond this heedlessness, it is unclear whether minimum resting
times would achieve their desired effects.  These limits impede arbitrage
between markets and products at least to some extent, diminishing effi-
cient price discovery.  Similarly, instead of receding to the background,
new types of manipulative HFT strategies would operate at slower, but
just as harmful, intervals.
Minimum resting times would have other harmful effects as well.  For
instance, preventing traders from cancelling limit orders means that such
orders are in constant danger of becoming stale and subject to adverse
selection.  Aggressive HFT strategies would likely submit market orders to
execute against a stale standing limit order and immediately sell the shares
at a higher price.  The aggressive market order thus profits at the expense
of the limit order, leading liquidity providers to increase spreads to hedge
against this additional risk.  Since market orders are typically more im-
pactful with respect to price, decreased liquidity leads to larger price
2. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Sandler O’Neill
& Partners, L.P. Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference: Enhancing Our Equity Mar-
ket Structure, Speech, (June 5, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/13705
42004312#.U5hzaihCw40.
3. See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New
Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L. J. 191 (2015).
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changes when a particularly aggressive market order hits a trading venue.
Thus, it is not surprising that other jurisdictions, like Australia and Eu-
rope, have rejected minimum order resting times.4
2. Minimum Order-to-Execution Ratios
Minimum order-to-execution ratios impose limits on a trader’s ability
to send orders to the market.  Once they hit the ratio’s limit, these traders
have to participate in a trade before submitting any new orders.  The po-
tential benefits of these ratios mirror those of minimum resting times: the
limit order book would likely be more stable since it would be harder to
cancel orders, providing the market with better, more accurate price esti-
mates.  However, unlike minimum resting times, traders wishing to submit
limit orders are not forced into a situation where they face adverse selec-
tion risk.  So long as the trader remains below the ratio, they can cancel
these orders at any time, meaning there is a smaller windfall to predatory
HFT strategies using market orders.5
One concern is that these ratios would also affect other beneficial HFT
trading strategies.  Again, Fox et al. note that HFT firms revise quotes for
many non-manipulative purposes.6  Statistical arbitrage strategies, for ex-
ample, naturally trigger cancellations and resubmissions to reduce price
discrepancies, and a restrictive minimum order-to-execution ratio could be
stifling.  Moreover, as with minimum resting times, certain order-to-execu-
tion ratios could cause ETF and derivatives valuations to become
unaligned due to decreased arbitrage activity, resulting in less accurate
prices and net efficiency losses.
An overly restrictive ratio would likewise undermine other market
functions.  Many algorithmic trading strategies seek to reduce trade execu-
tion costs by splitting large orders into smaller pieces and by sending or-
ders to markets in different amounts and at different times.7  As orders
execute or languish, the execution strategy recalibrates, leading to cancel-
lations and resubmissions.  This trading approach reduces costs for traders
and leads to greater efficiency in execution, but improperly restricting its
use would likely lead to higher spreads.  Meanwhile, too low a ratio will
result in traders sending fewer limit orders to the market, reducing overall
liquidity.
4. Adam Haigh, ASIC Scraps Minimum-Resting-Time Plan for Equity Trade Orders,
BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-30/asic-scraps
-minimum-resting-time-plan-for-equity-trade-orders; Philip Stafford and Alex Barker, EU
Clampdown on ‘flash boy’ traders turns technical, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2014), http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/40afcd9c-c3e3-11e3-870b00144feabdc0.html#axzz41r4GrRSS.
5. J. Doyne Farmer & Spyros Skouras, MINIMUM RESTING TIMES AND TRANSAC-
TION-TO-ORDER RATIOS: REVIEW OF AMENDMENT 2.3.F AND QUESTION 20, U.K. GOV’T
OFF. SCI. (2012).
6. See Fox, et al., supra note 3.
7. Id.
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Consequently, regulators can choose between two approaches.  First,
regulators can set the ratio at a relatively high level.  This reduces the like-
lihood that the ratio would improperly inhibit good HFT strategies,
though any efficiency gains would be relatively inconsequential.  Second,
regulators could differentiate order-to-trade ratios based on strategy and
historical trading activity.  This option would depend on regulators getting
more information from HFT firms through registration, discussed in Part
I.C.3.  Fox et al. do not consider whether more HFT-related trade data
would lead to more informed ratios.8  However, after gathering this data,
regulators could effectively charge both exchanges and HFT firms with
setting and enforcing reasonable and appropriate order-to-execution ra-
tios during various market conditions based on their historical trading pat-
terns and strategies.  Such an obligation would result in more tailored
regulation, preserve regulatory resources, and ensure beneficial HFT strat-
egies can continue to operate freely.
3. Frequent and On-Demand Batch Auctions
One of the more novel proposals under consideration involves replac-
ing the current continuous trading system with frequent batch auctions.
Professors Eric Budish, Peter Cramton, and John Shim, for instance, pro-
duced a plan where securities trading would consist of sealed-bid auctions
conducted at discrete time intervals, e.g., every second.9  They argue that
continuous time auctions regularly create opportunities for latency arbi-
trage since a trader will always benefit by being at the top of an order
book.10  As a result, the status quo rewards HFT firms that continuously
flood markets with orders since the emphasis is on speed, not on price.  In
contrast, batch auctions process orders received during a fixed time inter-
val simultaneously, which means that “if multiple traders observe the same
information at the same time, they are forced to compete on price instead
of speed.”11  Similarly, since batch auctions make it more difficult for HFT
strategies to determine if the trading venue will execute their order, each
trade would be more risky.  Thus, batch auctions theoretically incentivize
HFT firms to make more trades based on information related to a secur-
ity’s fundamentals and dissuade them from engaging in other aggressive
strategies that add little to price discovery.  Perhaps most importantly, the
market structure would also no longer incentivize HFT firms to invest as
many resources in speed-focused technologies that contribute little social
benefit.
Many jurisdictions are seriously considering variations of these fre-
quent batch auctions.  The London Stock Exchange, for instance, tested a
8. Id.
9. See Eric B. Budish, Peter Cramton, & John J. Shim, The High-Frequency Trading
Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130 Q. J. OF ECON., 1547,
1617-18 (July 23, 2015).
10. Id. at 1547-48.
11. Id. at 1556.
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midday auction program in some of its most liquid securities,12 and the
SEC has approved the Chicago Stock Exchange’s plan to launch a batch-
auction platform called CHX SNAP.13  At least in the United States, how-
ever, these auctions face significant implementation hurdles.  Specifically,
it is unclear how multiple discrete batch auctions across different trading
venues would interact with each other under existing United States law.
As in most equity markets, United States broker-dealers have a duty of
“best execution” when acting on behalf of a client.14  This duty obligates
broker-dealers to attain the most advantageous terms for their clients.15
Rule 611 of Regulation NMS forces broker-dealers to first route an order
to an exchange providing the national bid and best offer (NBBO), par-
tially assuring best execution.  Exchanges post quotes in continuous limit
order books, making it possible for broker-dealers to make sure they sub-
mit an order to the venue with the best price at a particular time.  In con-
trast, a multiple exchange, frequent batch auction system determines
prices only at the end of a batch interval, meaning a broker-dealer cannot
know in advance which venue will yield the best price.16
Even assuming the SEC could change Regulation NMS, every ex-
change would have to run its auctions simultaneously to completely shift
HFT competition from speed to price.  Absent such coordination, latency
arbitrage opportunities across markets and products would remain com-
monplace.  For instance, a batch auctioneer would need to synchronize a
stock’s processing time with the processing times of its associated deriva-
tives.  Likewise, latency arbitrage could still occur with respect to ETFs
since these auctioneers would need to synchronize every ETF’s batch auc-
tion with its component stocks, an almost impossible feat.
Synchronized batch times would also be undesirable from an efficiency
standpoint since optimal batch trading intervals, at least with respect to
12. Press Release, London Stock Exch., London Stock Exchange To Launch Midday
Auction (Nov. 11, 2014) (on file with author), http://www.lseg.com/resources/media-centre/
press-releases/london-stock-exchange-launch-midday-auction.
13. See Order Approving CHX Proposed Rule Change to Implement Intra-Day and
On-Demand Auction Service, Exchange Act Release No. 76087, 80 Fed. Reg. 61540.(Oct. 6,
2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-13/pdf/2015-25886.pdf.
14. See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY CHANGES IN
MARKET STRUCTURE 12-13 (2013), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD431.
pdf.
15. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); Payment
for Order Flow, Exchange Exchange Act Release No. 34902, 59 Fed. Reg. 55006, 55007 at
n.15 (Nov. 2, 1994); FINRA Rules, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., Rule 5310, http://
finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10455 [hereinaf-
ter FINRA Rules].
16. Markus Baldauf & Joshua Mollner, Trading in Fragmented Markets 40 (Stanford
Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Research Discussion Paper No. 15-018 2015), http://www-siepr.stanford.
edu/repec/sip/15-018.pdf.
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liquidity, vary by security.17  And from a systemic risk standpoint, market
interconnectivity would increase dramatically, intensifying the risk of sys-
tem-wide disruptions.  For example, issues in one market (e.g. the equities
market) could spill over into other markets (e.g. the options or futures
market) with more rapidity and frequency.
Still, variants of the Budish et al. auction model could complement and
improve on continuous trading dynamics.  One possible solution would in-
volve making batch auctions an on-demand function limited to large
trades.  PDQ, an alternative trading system, currently uses a trader-initi-
ated auction system for security orders.18  The system negates synchroni-
zation problems and protects large institutional orders from predatory,
latency-exploitive HFT strategies.  As an example, John submits a market
or marketable limit order to PDQ to buy 4,000 IBM shares.  Over the next
five to 20 milliseconds, depending on how fast John wishes his execution to
be, PDQ solicits liquidity for the trade by sharing only the stock’s name
with liquidity providers, keeping order direction, size, and price hidden.19
The trading venue aggregates HFT-submitted contra-side orders in re-
sponse to the solicitation at specific price levels at or within the NBBO.
PDQ then processes the auction, and 3,500 shares execute at these prices.
Depending on John’s preferences, PDQ either keeps the remaining order
for 500 shares on its order book, routes it to another trading venue for
execution, or has it cancelled.
Expanding these auctions to exchanges would present significant, but
not insurmountable, technical obstacles.  On-demand batch auctions as-
sume the national limit order book’s existence to determine at what prices
these auctions can clear.  But under current rules, on-demand auction run-
ners would need to disseminate auction orders to the national limit order
book and include them in the NBBO, despite these quotes not being im-
mediately executable or available to everyone.  In response, crafty HFT
strategies might send orders to both the auction and the continuous order
book to shift the NBBO in a particular direction.
To fix the latter problem, auction orders should have to meet minimum
size thresholds (e.g., 500 shares) and be noncancelable.  If the auction time
is set at a short-enough time period, these restrictions make it extremely
risky for traders to try to manipulate the NBBO, especially without know-
ing the size or direction of the auction trade.  With respect to the former
17. See Daniel Fricke & Austin Gerig, Too Fast or Too Slow? Determining the Optimal
Speed of Financial Markets 29-30 (Aug. 31, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2363114.
18. CODA Block, PDQ, https://www.pdqenterprises.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09
/CODABlockProductSheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2017); Auction1 On-Demand Auctions
from PDQ ATS, PDQ, http://www.pdqats.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Auction1_
2014_WEB.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2017); CODA Micro, PDQ, https://www.pdqenter
prises.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/CODAMicroProductSheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 28,
2017).
19. For larger trades, PDQ offers another on-demand auction service that extends the
auction’s length to up to 30 seconds. See CODA Block, supra note 18.
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problem, exchanges should still transmit these quotes to the market but
tag them as auction orders.  The SEC could then amend Rule 611 and
exempt these orders from inclusion in the NBBO calculation.20
This proposed exemption would be appropriate because on-demand
auctions have characteristics of a slow market.  A slow market occurs
when an exchange does not execute trades in a particular security at the
fastest possible speed.  Currently, Rule 611 only protects quotations that
are at the top of an order book and immediately accessible electronically,
meaning slow market quotes are not included in the NBBO.21  Since auc-
tion orders are also not immediately accessible or executable, it makes
sense to exclude these submitted quotes from the NBBO as well.  The
NBBO would still protect auction execution prices and eliminate the re-
verse fear of trading through the rest of the market.
The SEC originally enacted Rule 611 to push exchanges to become
electronic and automated, guaranteeing that investors always received the
best possible price.22  While on-demand auctions may hinder Regulation
NMS’ historical vision of universal “fast” markets, they give HFT liquidity
providers more incentives to compete based on price, while the continuing
availability of a continuous market ensures that traders can still get nearly
immediate execution.  These auctions also ensure that markets for differ-
ent but related securities like equities, derivatives, futures, and ETFs can
continue to operate independently.  Regulators would not need to make
any radical changes to Regulation NMS either, since the national limit or-
der book would still drive trading both inside and outside of these auc-
tions.  In short, on-demand auctions promote Rule 611’s true goals, price
protection and increased competition.
Admittedly, getting HFT firms to engage with these systems will be a
tall task so long as continuous order systems exist.  This result would be
undesirable because non-aggressive HFT order flow benefits non-HFT
traders via liquidity promotion and price competition.  Auction-runners,
however, can address this potential problem in two ways.  First, auction
runners could give HFT firms with higher liquidity rebates when their or-
ders execute in a batch auction.  Still, this solution is not entirely satisfac-
tory; it would increase market complexity, skew broker-dealer incentives
with respect to best execution, and fail to discourage HFT firms from in-
undating the auction platform with quotes (although restricting their abil-
ity to cancel submitted orders might).  A better approach would piggyback
off an HFT algorithm registration proposal, discussed later in the com-
ment, where firms would register specific algorithms with a regulator.  As
part of this process, the regulator would only allow passive market-making
HFT algorithms to enter these auctions.  If enough institutional trading
20. 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(d) (2017).
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(a) (2017).
22. See Morelli, supra note 1, at 107-14.
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activity migrates to on-demand auctions, research suggests that HFT will
follow.23
B. Measures Addressing Liquidity and Volatility Issues
As discussed in the first article, evidence suggests that HFT’s benefits
are limited to certain measures of liquidity and volatility in particular trad-
ing environments, and even then only with respect to specific types of se-
curities.24  Accordingly, regulators must determine how HFT can
optimally increase liquidity in historically illiquid stocks and reduce vola-
tility during periods of market stress.
1. Financial Transaction Taxes
Many scholars and government officials, including Joseph Stiglitz and
Hillary Clinton, have called on regulators to impose a small tax on every
order.25  Financial transaction taxes, like other taxes, reduce the amount
of the taxed activity.26  Thus, a financial transaction tax theoretically dis-
courages frivolous orders and encourages traders to base their trades on a
stock’s fundamentals, not their short-term price movements.27  Propo-
nents say the tax would limit the effectiveness of manipulative HFT strate-
gies, discourage excessive investment in financial market infrastructure,
and encourage market participants to shift towards longer-term invest-
ment strategies where the tax consequences will be less consequential.28
As of 2014, 11 of the 28 European Union countries had agreed to adopt a
version of these taxes, joining many other jurisdictions in Asia, Africa, and
North America.29
However, financial transaction taxes can generate substantial economic
distortions and unintended consequences, the most obvious being that
23. See generally Elaine Wah, Dylan Hurd & Michael Wellman, Strategic Market
Choice: Frequent Call Markets vs. Continuous Double Auctions for Fast and Slow Traders, in
THIRD CONFERENCE ON AUCTIONS: MARKET MECHANISMS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS 13
(Scott D. Kominers & Lirong Xia eds. 2015) (“[T]he fast traders chase agents into either
market, and slow traders under pursuit seek the protection of the frequent call market.”).
24. Morelli, supra note 1, at 124-26.
25. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, REWRITING THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 8, 69
(Roosevelt Inst. 2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Rewriting-
the-Rules-Report-Final-Single-Pages.pdf; Press Release, Hillary for America, Hillary Clin-
ton: Wall Street Should Work for Main Street 7 (Aug. 7, 2015), https://m.hrc.onl/briefing/
Hillary-Clintons-Wall-Street-Agenda.pdf.
26. See generally Leonard E. Burman et al., Financial Transaction Taxes in Theory and
Practice, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 171 (2016).
27. See, e.g., John Fullerton, High-frequency Trading is a Blight on Markets That the





210 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 6:201
they are likely to increase the cost of funding for the real economy.30  Sim-
ilarly, market actors might simply pass these costs to investors, meaning
the financial transaction tax is essentially a tax on investors.  Even if juris-
dictions pass targeted taxes imposed only on firms that have excessively
high order-trade ratios, HFT firms could simply avoid the tax by relocating
their operations to another exchange in another jurisdiction.31  In short,
policymakers should shelve the financial transaction tax given the practical
and political difficulties involved in setting up a global tax and the availa-
bility of other effective but less contentious policy options.
2. Small-Cap Tick Size Pilot Program
Because evidence suggests that HFT has boosted liquidity for some
securities but not others, regulators are considering ways to harness HFT
to increase liquidity more broadly.  The SEC’s Small-Cap Tick Size Pilot
Program is one such experiment.32  In October 2016, the SEC began a
two-year test program to see whether trading small-cap stocks in wider
increments would improve liquidity for these stocks.33  The test tempora-
rily rolls back the effects of “decimalization,” or trading in penny incre-
ments, for this segment of the market.
The pilot program includes stocks of companies that have market capi-
talizations of $3 billion or less, average daily trading volumes of one mil-
lion shares or less, and a volume weighted average price of at least $2.00.34
The SEC placed 1,400 stocks in a control group that will still trade in
penny increments.  One separate test group will include stocks quoted in
$0.05 increments but capable of being traded at any price, while a second
control group includes stocks that are both quoted and traded in $0.05
increments.  A final test group tests the “trade-at” rule, which requires
market participants to execute trades in these securities on an exchange
unless other non-exchange venues (e.g., dark pools and Electronic Com-
munication Networks (ECNs)) offer a “meaningfully” better price.35
The conceptual foundation of the program is quite clear.  The current
one-size-fits-all tick size regime subjects smaller issuers to the same trad-
ing framework as larger, multinational companies with much higher trad-
ing volumes and market caps.  Instead, regulators and exchanges should
30. Zsolt Darvas & Jakob Von Weizsäcker, Financial Transaction Tax: Small is Beauti-
ful, BRUEGEL POL’Y CONTRIBUTION, Feb. 2010, at 12-13, http://aei.pitt.edu/12885/1/pc_tobin
tax_080210.pdf.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See Order Approving the NMS Plan to Implement a Tick Size Pilot, Exchange Act
Release No. 74892, 80 Fed. Reg, 2714, 27546-53, (May 13, 2015), https://www.gpo.gov /fdsys/
pkg/FR-2015-05-13/pdf/2015-11425.pdf.
33. SEC, Investor Alert: Tick Size Pilot Program – What Investors Need To Know
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ia_ticksize.html.
34. Tick Size Pilot Program, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/tick-size-pilot-pro
gram (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
35. Id.
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tailor trading regimes to the liquidity needs of the issuer.  Wider tick sizes
result in wider spreads, making it more costly to trade.  At least with re-
spect to small-cap stocks, higher costs might lead to increased efforts by
both human and high frequency traders to capture the spread, in turn ad-
ding more bids and offers to the order book.  Deeper order books increase
liquidity, incentivizing investment banks to underwrite more IPOs and
fund more research coverage.  Of course, if regulators set the minimum
tick size too high, trading activity could migrate towards off-exchange
trading venues.  The trade-at rule, however, ensures that more trading in
these securities happens on exchanges, improving transparency and price
discovery.
Most existing literature examining the effect of tick sizes on trading
pre-dates HFT’s rise in the marketplace.36  Theoretically, however, HFT
firms are attracted to stocks with smaller tick sizes because there are more
increments in which a share can move, thus producing more trading op-
portunities.  Wider tick sizes make it more expensive for HFT firms to
enter and exit a given trading position, meaning HFT strategies trading in
these stocks would likely slow down: HFT would send fewer quotes to the
market, but HFT would likely not cancel and replace these quotes as
often.37  Whether this would improve or hurt liquidity is an empirical
question, one the data gathered from the pilot program might help answer.
But why should the pilot program be limited to small-cap stocks?
Many large-cap stocks rarely, if ever, trade at penny increments.  Why not
explore different tick sizes for these stocks as well?  For that matter, why
base tick sizes off capitalization at all?  Exchange-led self-regulatory initia-
tives in Europe, for instance, have largely harmonized tick sizes based on
price levels.38  The European Union’s Amendments to the Markets in Fi-
nancial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) formalizes this framework by
basing tick size on share price and other liquidity factors based on the
average number of trades per day.39  The system aims to find a better
compromise between the liquidity pooling in tick-size buckets while main-
taining enough granularity to avoid long trading queues.  Since evidence
suggests that HFT’s liquidity benefits do not extend to high volatility
stocks regardless of their capitalization, the SEC should at least investigate
a similar approach.40
36. For an empirical study on the topic, see Alex Frino, Vito Mollica & Shunquan
Zhang, The Impact of Tick Size on High Frequency Trading: Evidence from Stock Splits,
(May 18, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2607391.
37. Id. at 10-11.
38. Sviatoslav Rosov, 2 Fast 2 MiFID: What Does Brussels Have in Store for HFT,
CFA INST. (Oct. 19, 2015), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2015/10/19/too-fast-
to-mifid-ii-what-does-brussels-have-in-store-for-hft/.
39. Council Directive 65/349, art. 49, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 149 [hereinafter MiFID II];
Commission Proposal for a Regulatory Technical Standard in the Tick Size Regime for
Shares, Depositary Receipts, and ETFs, at 3-4, COM (2016) 4389 final (July 14, 2016).
40. See Jonathan Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott, & Ryan Riordan, High-Frequency
Trading and Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2267 (2014).
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3. Market-Making Obligations
Market-making obligations would direct a trader acting as a market
maker to post prices to buy and sell at competitive levels at all times a
trading venue is open regardless of market conditions.41  HFT firms cur-
rently face no regulatory obligation to make markets.42  Exchanges have
some market-making rules but “no true affirmative quoting or trading re-
quirements.”43  Even in the limited circumstances where market partici-
pants have to enter quotes, “the current system le[ads] to practices like
‘stub-quoting,’ in which a trader quotes way outside the price range of a
particular stock just to meet minimal market making requirements.”44
A market-making obligation could take several forms: HFT market
makers might be required to remain in the market for a certain length of
time during the trading day, quote securities of a minimum market capital-
ization, and/or quote prices that are at or within an exchange’s best bid
and offer for a minimum percentage of the trading day.45  Obligations to
set competitive prices could help reduce volatility, both on an individual
and system-wide level.  Requirements to stay in the market continuously,
meanwhile, could improve liquidity provision by ensuring security prices
remain actively quoted during periods of market stress.  To the extent that
these obligations improve the depth of the market through minimum
quote size requirements, traders would also find it easier to buy and sell,
lowering transaction costs and bolstering liquidity.
Nonetheless, market-making is not a costless enterprise.  All market
makers face situations where they face the risk of large losses.  These costs
are exacerbated when HFT market-making strategies conduct cross-mar-
ket and cross-product trading.  Historically, exchange rules resolved to
41. Oliver Linton, Maureen O’Hara & J.P. Zigrand, Economic Impact Assessments on
MiFID II Policy Measures Related to Computer Trading in Financial Markets 17-21 (U.K.
Gov’t Off. Sci., Foresight Project, Working Paper No. 12/1088, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/289075/12-1088-economic-impact-
mifid-2-measures-computer-trading.pdf.
42. Liz Moyer, High-Frequency Firms Urge SEC to Add to Market-Makers’ Obliga-
tions, FORBES (Jul. 13, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/streettalk/2010/07/13/high-fre
quency-firms-urge-sec-to-add-to-market-makers-obligations/#775bc43e29bb
43. Letter from John A. McCarthy et al., Gen. Counsel, GETCO, LLC, to Robert
Cook, Dir., Div. Trading & Mkts, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 9, 2010), https://
www.sec.gov/ comments/s7-02-10/s70210-255.pdf.
44. Moyer, supra note 43.
45. As an example, under MiFID II in the E.U., member states are required to guar-
antee its regulated markets have in place written agreements with all investment firms pursu-
ing a market-making strategy.  Firms trigger these obligations when dealing in their own
account post simultaneous two-way quotes of comparable size and competitive prices in at
least one security on one trading venue for at least 50% of daily trading hours.  These agree-
ments must also compel the market maker to continue quoting in this way, although they can
also state that market makers may exit the market during “exceptional circumstances,” which
are determined by individual trading venues.  Commission Proposal for a Regulatory Techni-
cal Standard Specifying Requirements for Market Making, at 6-9, COM (2016) 3523 final
(June 13, 2016).
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give market makers certain benefits to compensate them for the risk in-
herent in their market-making obligation.  To the extent that rules impose
these obligations without corresponding compensation, at least some mar-
ket makers will exit, reducing liquidity.
Similarly, market-making during stressful conditions is tremendously
risky.  Requiring HFT market makers to buy when prices are crashing may
lead them to exit the market, but this time not on their own accord.46
More significantly, any HFT market-making obligations face significant
definitional issues.  What exactly would it mean to maintain “quotes” in
the market?  If the definition is too vague, HFT firms could simply evade
the requirements by posting one quote on the side of the market on which
it wishes to take a position and posting another on the other side away
from competitive prices (called “stub quotes”).  In other words, the quality
of the available liquidity would not improve.  And finally, as Fox et al.
note, “historical evidence suggests that strong paper obligations have
proved insufficient in the past to motivate market makers to continue sup-
plying liquidity during periods of extreme volatility,” indicating that any
obligation would be near impossible to enforce.47
Nonetheless, it is telling that major HFT firms have urged the SEC to
impose stricter market-making obligations.48  As these firms acknowledge,
“additional market maker obligations will significantly reduce the chance
of another destabilizing event,” suggesting the costs of a well-defined obli-
gation are not prohibitively high.49  To that effect, regulators should re-
quire HFT firms who qualify as market makers to quote at or inside the
NBBO for a certain percentage of the trading day based on the price, li-
quidity, and volatility characteristics of the security.  Regulators should
also use these characteristics to set minimum quote size (e.g. 200, 500, or
1000 shares) and market depth obligations (e.g. 3-5 price levels below the
applicable price obligation).  There should similarly be a maximum quote
length requirement to fix issues with stub quotes.  Finally, to remedy Fox
et al.’s enforcement concerns, trading venues could compensate HFT firms
for their increased market making by altering their maker-taker systems,
discussed below.
46. The MiFID II proposal wisely allows market makers to exit the markets during
“exceptional circumstances” as determined by individual trading venues. See Tony Katz &
Puesan Lam, MiFID II: Microstructural Issues, DLA PIPER (Oct. 2015), https://
www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Insights/Publications/2015/10/DLA%20Piper_MiFID%20II
_Microstructural%20Issues_October%202015.ashx.
47. See Fox, et al., supra note 3.
48. See McCarthy et al., supra note 44.
49. Id.
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4. Dynamic Maker-Taker Fees
Another intriguing option involves altering the existing maker-taker
fee programs offered by most trading venues.50  Many have criticized the
current maker-taker system on conflict of interest,51 market transparency,
and market complexity grounds.52  Accordingly, most calls for reform in
this area either propose lowering the maker-taker fee cap,53 currently set
at $0.003 per share,54 or outright prohibiting the payment of rebates alto-
gether.55  Both sets of proposals, however, overlook the potential benefits
of dynamic fees.  By making these fees more customizable, exchanges can
incentivize liquidity provision at key times.  For instance, Blackrock, the
world’s largest asset manager, recently suggested that highly-liquid securi-
ties might not need as high a rebate compared to less liquid securities, and
that therefore fees should be limited to thinly-traded securities.56  Simi-
larly, allowing for larger maker-taker fees when trading in categories of
illiquid, small-cap stocks will make capital raising easier for small busi-
nesses, benefitting the overall economy.
Still, trading platforms would have to tread carefully when setting the
maker-taker fee tiers or else risk depriving thinly-traded securities of any
liquidity benefits.  For example, BATS recently proposed segmenting
maker-taker fees based on a variety of security-specific factors, including
its average daily volume, market capitalization, inclusion in certain broad
market indices, security type, or some combination thereof.57  The SEC is
50. See Open Letter, BATS, Market Structure Reform Discussion, at 3-4 (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources/newsletters/OpenLetter010615.pdf (discussing BATS’
suggested tiered approach to access fees).
51. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Carl Levin, to Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC (July 9, 2014),
www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/levin-letter-to-sec-chairman-mary-jo-white-re-equity-mar
ket-structure-july-15_2014; U.S. Senator Seeks Reform of Maker-Taker Pricing Model,
REUTERS (May 10, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/sec-schumer-idUSL1E8GA7GS
20120510.
52. See, e.g., Stanislav Dolgopolov, The Maker-Taker Pricing Model and its Impact on
the Securities Market Structure: A Can of Worms for Securities Fraud?, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
231, 270 (2014).
53. Larry Tabb, The Grand Bargain: A Great Start, But Don’t Hold Your Breath,
TABBFORUM (Jan. 6, 2015), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/the-grand-bargain-a-great-start-
butdon’t-hold-your-breath.
54. See 17 C.F.R. 242.610(c) (2017).
55. See, e.g., Robert Battalio, Shane A. Corwin, & Robert Jennings, Can Brokers
Have it All? On the Relation Between Make-Take Fees and Limit Order Execution Quality,
at 2 (Oct. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2367462&download=yes.
56. See U.S. Equity Market Structure: An Investor Perspective, VIEWPOINT (Black-
Rock, New York, N.Y.). Apr. 2014, at 7, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/litera
ture/whitepaper/viewpoint-us-equity-market-structure-april-2014.pdf (“[T]he need for incen-
tives and rebates is not the same across all stocks. Regulators should review whether highly
liquid stocks require any rebates at all.”).
57. See Open Letter, BATS, supra note 51.
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likewise considering a pilot program aimed at assessing the effect of
maker-taker fees and their alternatives on certain stocks.58
Unfortunately, the BATS proposal substantially increases market com-
plexity.59  A recent study by the Royal Bank of Canada found that there
already were 839 different fee schedules across U.S. exchanges.60  Even
assuming that regulators or exchanges could determine an optimal fee
structure, a dynamic fee system demands vigilant monitoring by trading
venues, which would be costly.  Regardless of the cost, a dynamic system
does not necessarily alleviate fears that certain HFT strategies will game
these systems, causing periodic artificial drops in liquidity.  Part of the
problem stems from the breakneck rate at which market complexity in-
creased, leaving regulators in the rearview mirror.  At this stage, allowing
exchanges to tier their fees would only complicate matters further.
Nonetheless, commentators have paid relatively little attention toward
altering the maker-taker system during periods of high volatility and low
liquidity.  For example, this structure would allow exchanges to increase
the size of these fees if trading activity trips a circuit breaker or exceeds a
limit-up limit-down band.61  If the maker rebates were high enough, they
would incentivize HFTs to make markets instead of fleeing markets en-
tirely.  Although the configuration would still increase market complexity
to some degree, exchanges would retain discretion about whether to acti-
vate the altered fees, meaning regulators would control the complexity in-
stead of the other way around.  Over time, as regulators and exchanges
learn more about how HFT operates, they can set an optimal level of fees,
harnessing HFT’s benefits while minimizing its detrimental effects.
C. Measures Addressing Market Stability Issues
To deal with issues related to market stability and systemic risk, regula-
tors must focus their efforts on maintaining HFT’s presence in the market,
in good times and in bad.  The market-making obligations and dynamic
maker-taker fees discussed above would go a long way towards accom-
plishing this.  Still, regulators must gather more details about how HFT
58. Regulatory Reforms to Improve Equity Market Structure: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 114th
Cong. 6 (2016) (Statement of Stephen Luparello, Dir., SEC Div. of Trading & Mkts) (indicat-
ing that the SEC would implement a maker-taker fee pilot program if its Equity Market
Structure Advisory Committee recommended such action).
59. See The Role of Regulation in Shaping Equity Market Structure and Electronic
Trading: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 4-5
(2014) (Statement of Jeffrey Sprecher, CEO, Intercontinental Exch., Inc.) (stating that
maker-taker pricing should be banned because it adds to market complexity).
60. See Nathaniel Popper, Stock Exchange Prices Grow So Convoluted Even Traders
are Confused, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/03/02/business/dealbook/stock-exchange-prices-grow-so-convoluted-even-traders-are-
confused-study-finds.html.
61. Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH.
L. REV. 523, 608 (2014); Fox et al., supra note 3.
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firms design their strategies and under what conditions they are most vul-
nerable to malfunctions.  Regulators must also investigate ways in which
they can manage HFT-induced market interdependence and correlations
without unduly hampering the benefits of inter-exchange price
competition.
The SEC has already taken several steps in this area, most notably by
revamping single-stock circuit breakers62 and instituting the Limit-Up
Limit-Down Rule.63  The SEC also passed Regulation Systems Compli-
ance and Integrity (Reg. SCI) in 2014, imposing stringent compliance and
monitoring requirements on most trading platforms.64
Observers like Professor Charles Korsmo place great faith in these
measures’ effectiveness, noting that circuit breakers and the limit-up limit-
down mechanism “are the most straightforward way[s] to prevent a repeat
of the major dislocations of the Flash Crash.”65  Similarly, Professors Fox,
Golsten, and Rauterberg enthusiastically endorse both measures as “mod-
erate proposals which should have salutary effects in moderating future
crashes.”66
Yet despite their apparently simple and uncontroversial nature, both
measures have significant shortcomings.  Circuit breakers are blunt tools
that are artificially set and often too far-reaching.67  The Limit-Up Limit-
62. Under these circuit breakers, trading in a given NMS stock is paused across U.S.
equity markets for a five-minute period if that the stock experiences a significant price de-
cline over the preceding five minutes (10%, 20%, or 30%, depending on the stock). See
Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Trading
Pauses Due to Extraordinary Market Volatility, Exchange Act Release No. 62,252, 98 SEC
Docket 2160 (June 10, 2010).  In 2012, the SEC altered the program by, among other things,
decreasing the market decline thresholds and extending the length of the trading halt. See
Order Approving the NMS Plan to Address Extraordinary Market Volatility, Exchange Act
Release No. 67,091, 77 Fed. Reg. 33498, 33508-10 (June 6, 2012).
63. Under the rule, limit-up limit-down price bands are calculated (and recalculated at
throughout the trading day) for each security at a percentage above and below the security’s
average price over the prior five minutes of trading.  Trading cannot occur outside of these
price bands.  For more liquid stocks, the percentage level for the price band is five percent
while the percentage level for most other stocks is 10%.  The rule includes several exceptions,
the most notable of which is the doubling these price bands during the opening and closing
periods of the trading day. See FINRA Rules, at Rule 6190; NMS Plan to Address Extraordi-
nary Market Volatility (as amended by SEC Approval Order, Exchange Act Release No.
77679) 11 (2016), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/regulation-NMS-plan-to-address-ex
traordinary-market-volatility.pdf.
64. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.1000-07 (2017).  Under the regulations, these trading venues must
also promptly disclose technology problems to the SEC when they occur.  Regulation SCI
does not impact HFT directly but does force trading venues to more closely monitor HFT
activity. See Regulation SCI Adopting Release, Exchange Act Release No. 73639, 79 Fed.
Reg. 72252, 72410 (Dec. 5, 2014).
65. Korsmo, supra note 61.
66. See Fox, et al., supra note 3, at 272.
67. See, e.g., Bradley Hope & Dan Strumpf, The Problem With Circuit Breakers, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-problem-with-circuit-breakers-
1452205576; Lee Chyen Yee & Samuel Shen, China suspends market circuit breaker mecha-
nism after stock market rout, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-
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Down Rule, meanwhile, has also exhibited significant shortcomings when
faced with extreme market volatility.68  In a 2014 speech, then-SEC Chair
Mary Jo White acknowledged that technology had “transformed the na-
ture of trading” such that regulators could only address the problems
posed by modern trading practices through substantial regulatory efforts
targeting market stability.69  While accepting that HFT was an inevitable
result of technological advancement, she stressed that the SEC was “as-
sessing the extent to which specific elements of the computer-driven trad-
ing environment may be working against investors” and imposing
systematic risks to secondary markets more generally.70  In 2016, White
gave an update on those SEC assessments, again highlighting the chal-
lenges associated with developing a regulatory response to “troubling”
trading practices.71  Indeed, HFT firms, with their large trading footprints,
can uniquely affect broader secondary market activities both domestically
and abroad.  This section details several measures financial regulators can
enact to manage these risks.
1. Anti-Disruptive Trading Rules
The SEC is currently considering an anti-disruptive trading rule that
would “apply to active proprietary traders in short time periods when li-
stocks-idUSKBN0UL1RC20160107 (describing China’s difficulties with successfully imple-
menting stock circuit breakers); see also Memorandum from the Mkt. Quality Subcomm. to
the Equity Mkt. Structure Advisory Comm. 2 (July 25, 2016) (https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
emsac/emsac-market-quality-subcommittee-recomendation-072516.pdf) (noting that had a
market-wide circuit breaker been triggered during an acute incident of market stress, “it
would have contributed to market chaos and selling pressure, thereby exacerbat[ing] the
situation”).
68. On August 24, 2015, US markets fell sharply due to worries over economic trou-
bles in China and other commodity-dependent emerging markets.  Pre-market volatility
levels were high.  Ten minutes after the opening bell, nearly half of NYSE-listed equities had
yet to begin trading.  It was not until almost 10:00 AM that all S&P 500 securities opened.
Wild price swings resulted, triggering nearly 1,300 trading halts as required by the Limit-Up
Limit-Down bands.  The trading halts caused so much disruption that market could not com-
pletely stabilize until well into the afternoon. See Circuit Breakers and New Market Structure
Realities, STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.ssga.com/investment
-topics/general-investing/2016/circuit-breakers-and-new-market-structure-realities.pdf.  The
SEC’s Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee (EMSAC) issued a memorandum in
the aftermath of this event, which acknowledged that the Limit-Up Limit-Down mechanism’s
re-opening process “does not function well” and suffers from a “dearth of market participa-
tion.”  To that end, the EMSAC recommended that the Limit-Up Limit Down protocol be
amended to allow for a more gradual re-opening process and include a “mean reversion”
process that would “allow[ a stock] to trade back to its original price without triggering bands
on the way back up.” See Memorandum, supra note 67.
69. White, supra note 2.
70. Id.
71. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Secur-
ity Traders Association 83rd Annual Market Structures Conference: Equity Market Structure
for 2016 and for the Future (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/white-equity-
market-structure-2016-09-14.html.
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quidity is most vulnerable and the risk of price disruption caused by ag-
gressive short-term trading strategies is highest.”72  Although the SEC has
not released a formal rule proposal, former Chair White indicated the new
rule would likely include “affirmative or negative trading obligations for
high-frequency trading firms that employ the fastest, most sophisticated
trading tools.”73
The rule might bear similarities to the CFTC’s anti-disruptive trading
practices rule, which makes it unlawful in the futures and commodities
space for any person to engage in any trading, practice, or conduct that (i)
violates bids or offers; (ii) demonstrates an intentional or reckless disre-
gard for the orderly execution of transactions during the closing period; or
(iii) constitutes spoofing.74  Exchanges have also experimented with anti-
disruptive trading rules.  For instance, the SEC recently approved a BATS-
proposed rule prohibiting exchange members from engaging in or facilitat-
ing disruptive quoting and trading activity.75  The rule built off the ex-
change’s existing anti-manipulation authority, but defined and prohibited
disruptive trading with more specificity.76  To that end, the rule also gives
BATS more power to cut off-exchange access when a client engages in
such activity.77
An anti-disruptive trading rule along the lines proposed would benefit
market stability in several ways.  Markets are often subject to extreme vol-
atility, so a rule restricting aggressive HFT strategies from removing large
amounts of liquidity during those times would dampen HFT’s amplifica-
tory effect on severe market swings.  But the rule will only be effective if it
is targeted and well-defined.  Regulators need to identify not only which
activities are disruptive, but also “which traders should be restricted” and
“during which time periods” these restrictions should apply.78  Too broad
a definition will capture legitimate activity, potentially chilling such trad-
ing and impeding HFT firms that can and want to provide liquidity to the
market from doing so.  On the other hand, too narrow a definition will
72. White, supra note 2.
73. Id. However, Stephen Luparello, the head of the SEC’s Trading and Markets divi-
sion, suggested that the rule might instead resemble NYSE’s requirements for specialists,
which impose an obligation to act as a liquidity provider of last resort. See Emmanuel
Olaoye, Anti-Disruptive Trading Rule Will Look Like Old Specialist Rules, Says Senior SEC
Official, COMPLIANCE COMPLETE (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.conatum.com/presscites/Anti
Disruptive.pdf.
74. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5) (2016).
75. Order Approving BATS Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Disruptive Quoting
and Trading Activity, Exchange Act Release No. 77171, 81 Fed. Reg. 9017 (Feb. 18, 2016);
Rules of BATS BZX Exchange, Inc., BATS, at Rule 12.15, http://cdn.batstrading.com/re
sources/regulation/rule_book/BATS_Exchange_Rulebook.pdf.
76. Id.
77. Id. at Rule 8.17.
78. High Frequency Trading’s Impact on The Economy: Hearing Before the S. Sub-
comm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong.
34 (2014) (statement of Hal S. Scott, Dir., Comm. on Capital Markets Regulation).
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prevent the SEC from evaluating the facts and circumstances of each case,
an equally undesirable outcome.  In response, then-Chair White claimed
that the rule would be “tailored to apply to active proprietary traders” in
short time periods.79  Yet as other regulatory efforts have shown, these
definitions are sometimes hard to pin down.80
As with other measures, successful implementation of an anti-disrup-
tive trading rule depends on accurately parsing out the good HFT from the
bad.  The SEC’s ongoing data-driven approach to regulation, detailed
more thoroughly below, should continue and help the agency define what
constitutes disruptive trading, who does it, and when do they do it.  To
ensure a good rule, regulators must quantify disruptive trading and iden-
tify instances of it in market data.  Despite the SEC’s best efforts, there
will always be false positives.  But if the SEC takes enough care in devel-
oping the rule and adjusting it going forward, detection and market stabil-
ity should improve.
2. Order Message Limits
Many exchanges already limit the number of messages its members can
send on a per second basis.  Traders can submit four types of messages to
an order book: to add a limit order, to cancel a limit order, to cancel and
replace one limit order with another, and to place a market order.81  HFT
strategies often send hundreds of these messages every second, but a trad-
ing platform can limit the number of messages that a market participant
can send to it by either rejecting messages sent in excess of the limit or
cutting the market participant off completely.82  Other exchanges have
message pricing systems that impose further monetary penalties for exces-
sive ordering.83
These “throttles,” when tripped, can aid in the rapid detection of mal-
functioning algorithms while reducing the damage caused by manipulative
algorithms, like quote stuffing strategies.84  Throttles improve market sta-
bility in several ways: they protect the stability of a trading venue’s order
79. See White, supra note 2.
80. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4) (2016) (Volcker Rule definition of “proprietary
trading”).
81. See David Kane, Andrew Liu & Khanh Nguyen, Analyzing an Electronic Limit
Order Book, R. J., June 2011, at 64, 64.
82. For example, the Eurex exchange will automatically “throttle,” or cut off, messag-
ing after a member sends 150 or more messages in a second and automatically disconnects
the member entirely should messaging exceed 450 messages a second.  Megan Morgan,
What’s the Best Way to Regulate HFT, TABB FORUM (Feb. 12, 2014), http://tabbforum.com /
opinions/what’s-the-best-way-to-regulate-hft.
83. Linton & O’Hara, supra note 42, at 24.
84. See Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. 78823 (proposed Nov. 24, 2015);
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 81 Fed. Reg. 85334 (proposed Nov. 25, 2016)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 38, 40, 170); see also Concept Release on Risk Controls
and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56542 (Sept. 12,
2013).
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processing system, give these trading venues and market participants flexi-
bility when responding to questionable trading patterns, and automatically
cut off problematic trading activity before its effects spread to other trad-
ing platforms or asset classes.  Throttles also represent a beacon of simplic-
ity in a sea of complexity.  Such limits apply to everyone, and can easily
adapt to changing market conditions if designed correctly.
In the futures and commodities space, the CFTC recently proposed
Regulation AT.  Among other things, Regulation AT mandates that al-
gorithmic traders and exchanges establish maximum message limits as part
of its pre-trade risk control process.85  The regulation does not set particu-
lar limits or thresholds, but rather gives traders and exchanges the discre-
tion to set levels reasonably designed to prevent Algorithmic Trading
Events, defined as either an algorithmic trading compliance issue or an
algorithmic trading disruption.86
Regulators should apply this approach across all secondary markets.
Allowing HFT firms to set their own message limits, ones informed by
specific information including the strategy being employed and that sys-
tem’s speed, avoids the under or over-inclusiveness problems accompany-
ing a strict message limit.  Exchanges, meanwhile, can vary message limits
as appropriate based on factors like the time of day, type of security, and
current market conditions.  More generally, shifting the supervisory onus
onto algorithmic traders and exchanges should make them more sensitive
to market stability issues, which in turn should encourage more dialogue
between the industry and regulators and spurring cultures of compliance
within HFT firms.  Importantly, overall market complexity is unlikely to
increase much; if anything, complexity might decrease as exchanges and
market participants come to consensuses about what the most appropriate
message limits for particular types of strategies should be.
3. HFT Registration and Disclosure Requirements
The SEC recently proposed an amendment to Rule 15b9-1 that would
call for many HFT firms to register with FINRA.87  While many HFT
firms are already subject to SEC oversight as brokers, the rule change
would boost the SEC’s ability to monitor for fraud across markets by ex-
panding the number of firms subject to FINRA examinations and enforce-
ment actions.88
85. Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. at 78852.
86. Id.
87. See Exemption for Certain Exchange Members, Exchange Act Release No. 74581,
80 Fed. Reg. 18036, 18038-39 (proposed Apr. 2, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
88. The proposed amendment would eliminate the de minimis allowance for off-ex-
change and proprietary trading, and would and “replace it with a more targeted exemption
from [FINRA] membership for a broker-dealer that conducts business on a national securi-
ties exchange” and trades off-exchange solely for hedging purposes. Id. at 18045-46.
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The amendment’s registration, reporting, and transparency objectives
further important security and fairness goals.89  These mechanisms convey
important information about individual firms and systemic risk to regula-
tors.  Under a more comprehensive registration regime, regulators could
identify those HFT strategies posing systemic risks with more certainty.
Regulators could also isolate and investigate HFT firms contributing to
severe market disruptions in a more cost and time-efficient way.  Conse-
quently, regulators would have the ability to implement necessary market
infrastructure changes more quickly and effectively.  Moreover, informa-
tion regarding how and where these strategies operate as well as what se-
curities they deal in will lead to a better mapping of secondary markets,
giving regulators more insight into where these markets are most apt to
transmit the effects of disruptive trading to other markets.  Likewise, re-
gistration would increase the effectiveness of other proposed measures of-
fered in this article, including on-demand auctions and order messaging
limits.
Markets would likely also become more transparent.  Under the pro-
posed amendment, HFT firms would not need to join FINRA if they limit
their trading to exchanges where they are members.90  Thus, some firms
could decide to stop their off-exchange trading while others opt to reduce
such activity to curb the increased costs of trading that would result from
FINRA membership.
While off-exchange trading undoubtedly has its benefits, including
smaller bid-ask spreads and more market depth, the current proportions
are too lopsided.91  So much trading now happens away from exchanges
that publicly quoted prices may no longer properly reflect a security’s true
price.92  Given that Dark Pools and ECNs price their transactions based
on the prices published by “lit” exchanges, inaccurate exchange prices also
skew off-exchange pricing.93  In short, more on-exchange trading will lead
to more informed pricing that, all things equal, will make market prices
more stable.  In turn, because it is easier for companies to raise capital in
89. Id. at 18070 (requiring an exempt dealer to comply with record retention require-
ments of 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4).
90. Id.
91. See Rhodri Preece, CFA INSTITUTE, DARK POOLS, INTERNALIZATION, AND EQ-
UITY MARKET QUALITY 60-61 (2012); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Changing
Business Models of Stock Exchanges and Stock Market Fragmentation, in OECD BUSINESS
AND FINANCE OUTLOOK 2016, at 120 (finding that, in 2015, 33% of all U.S. stock trades took
were off-exchange, and 42% of all trades were in the form of “dark trading”).
92. Public Statement of Louis E. Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, U.S. Equity Market Struc-
ture: Making Our Markets Work Better for Investors, (May 11, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/
news /statement/us-equity-market-structure.html. See also John McCrank, Dark Markets May
Be More Harmful Than High Frequency Trading, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2014), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-markets-darkpools-analysis-idUSBREA3605M20140407.
93. Id.
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stable secondary markets, the cost of capital will fall, increasing
efficiency.94
Amending Rule 15b9-1 is a useful first step, but the SEC should also
consider incorporating aspects of similar, more detailed registration re-
quirements pioneered by its foreign counterparts.  For instance, the Euro-
pean Union’s MiFID II proposal requires significant disclosures.95  HFT
firms must give their home state regulators descriptions of their al-
gorithmic trading strategies, details of the trading parameters or limits to
which the system is subject, and the key compliance and risk controls that
it has in place.96  Registered HFT firms and trading venues must also es-
tablish effective systems and risk controls to ensure trading systems are
resilient and have enough capacity.97  As part of these risk controls, senior
management at HFT firms must designate a “responsible party” to sign off
on the initial deployment or a substantial update to an algorithmic trading
system or strategy.98  The directive further mandates that firms test their
algorithms to ensure they work as intended in stressed market conditions
and, if necessary, be able to turn them off when the situation demands it.99
In turn, trading venues that allow algorithmic trading need to perform due
diligence and conformance testing on the users of its systems.100
Imposing more specific registration requirements is a path worth con-
sidering.  The long-term effects of, for instance, requiring descriptions and
periodic testing of algorithms alongside registration would improve mar-
ket stability tremendously.  HFT algorithms will become more resilient,
and regulators more competent at supervising them.  Of course, too strin-
gent requirements might cause HFT firms to flee to less regulated trading
platforms or jurisdictions.  Coming up with conditions to test these algo-
rithms will also, at least initially, be difficult and costly.  Regulatory coor-
dination and information sharing, however, can mitigate these concerns,
discussed more thoroughly in Part II.
D. Measures Addressing Investor Protection Issues
Regulators must restore the public’s faith that the secondary market
protects their interests.  First, regulators must make the secondary market
more transparent.  Investor protection concerns in the HFT context pri-
marily revolve around opacity: only the most sophisticated investors know
94. Nicholas Economides & Robert Schwartz, Electronic Call Market Trading, 21 J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., no. 3, 1995, at 10.
95. See MiFID II, supra note 40, at arts. 17, 48; Commission Proposal for Regulatory
Technical Standards on the Organisational Requirements of Investment Firms Engaged in Al-
gorithmic Trading, COM (2016) 4478 final (Aug, 19, 2016) [hereinafter RTS 6]; see also Katz
& Lam, supra note  47.
96. MiFID II, at art. 17(2); RTS 6, at art. 28.
97. MiFID II, at. 17(1).
98. RTS 6, at art. 5.
99. MiFID, at art. 17; RTS 6, at arts. 6-10.
100. MiFID II, at art. 48.
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the ins-and-outs of how HFT and trading dynamics work.101  Second, reg-
ulators must assure investors that they can catch predatory HFT strategies
in the act.  To accomplish this, regulators must amplify their surveillance
capabilities and aggressively pursue enforcement actions against manipu-
lative HFT strategies.  However, regulators must also make sure not to
demonize HFT strategies that add value to secondary markets.  As previ-
ously discussed, electronic trading developed, at least in part, to curb cer-
tain abusive practices of manual traders.  Regulation must maintain HFT’s
competitive benefits.  Finally, regulators must enhance the perceived fair-
ness of secondary markets in the eyes of the public.  Competitive pressure
to increase order flow pushed trading venues to cater to HFT demands,
creating what many perceived as a “two-tiered” market.  Co-location, pro-
prietary data feeds, and specialized order types all animate claims that the
market is rigged.102  Regulators should revisit each of these developments
and determine if they actually serve the public interest.
Despite this, the SEC has taken several positive steps to make secon-
dary markets more transparent and manageable.  In 2011, the SEC passed
the Large Trader Reporting Rule, imposing registration and reporting re-
quirements on certain traders that exceed defined volume thresholds.103
The rule allows the SEC to see how major traders interact with securities
markets, reconstruct trading activity following periods of extreme market
volatility, and apply the data gained from the reporting system for regula-
tory purposes going forward.
Similarly, in 2012 the SEC adopted Rule 613, requiring national securi-
ties exchanges and FINRA to submit plans to create, implement, and
maintain a consolidated audit trail (CAT) designed to track the life cycle
of all orders and trades.104  Although exchanges report executed trades to
the consolidated market data system, there is currently no database that
logs records of all order activity, including canceled orders.105  If the in-
dustry implements CAT on budget and regulators take steps to ensure the
data given to it is accurate, it will allow regulators to track secondary mar-
101. See generally Morelli, supra note 1, at 127-28.
102. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASHBOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014); Laurie
Carver, Exchange Order Types Prompt Fears of HFT Conspiracy, RISK MAG. (April 23,
2013), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2261626/exchange-order-types-prompt-
fears-of-hft-conspiracy.
103. Large Trader Reporting Adopting Release, Exchange Act Release No. 64976, 76
Fed. Reg. 46960 (Aug. 3, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13h-I) (requiring registration by
entities who trade either two million shares or $20 million during any calendar day, or 20
million shares or $200 million during any calendar month).
104. Consolidated Audit Trail Adopting Release, Exchange Act Release No. 67457, 77
Fed. Reg. 45722 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 242.613).
105. Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves New Rule Requiring Consolidated Audit Trail
to Monitor and Analyze Trading Activity (July 11, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Press-
Release/Detail/PressRelease/1365171483188#.UkXTmMi30AM.
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ket activity more accurately and efficiently.106  Of course, this is a big
“if.”107  Still, by creating a central repository of trading data, the SEC and
other regulators can link customer account information to order event
data and perform ongoing surveillance while also letting regulators com-
plete market reconstructions.  Equally important, CAT should enable
more effective private enforcement, potentially giving private parties an-
other tool with which they can reconstruct HFT manipulation to establish
causation and intent in class action claims.108
Moreover, in 2013, the SEC established its Market Information Data
Analytics System (MIDAS) as the agency’s official trade monitoring sys-
tem.109  MIDAS collects more than one billion records every day, and al-
lows the agency to quickly reconstruct trading activity after extreme
106. FINRA currently operates the Order Audit Trail System (OATS), an analogous
system that tracks order and execution data for most U.S.-listed stocks.  One recurring issue
with the OATS system involves data integrity: the system is useful only to the extent that the
data firms send it is accurate and complete. See, e.g. Matt Robinson & Sam Mamudi,
Goldman Fined $1.8 Million by FINRA Over Inaccurate Trading Data, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 27,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-27/goldman-fined-1-8-million-by-
finra-over-inaccurate-trading-data.
107. In March 2016, Senator Michael Crapo of Idaho remarked that it was “beyond
frustrating that six years after the Flash Crash we still haven’t built the CAT.” Regulatory
Reforms to Improve Equity Market Structure: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. &
Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. 3 (2016).  However, in
November 2016, the SEC finally approved a plan to implement CAT.  In the approved plan,
the SEC envisions a two-year implementation period.  It also contemplates that both trading
platforms and industry members will fund the system through tiered fixed fees based on
messaging traffic.  Estimates regarding CAT’s total costs ranged from $30 million to $91.6
million, with annual maintenance costs spanning from $27 million to $93 million (though
many estimates also expected maintenance costs to be much higher than these figures in the
first five years).  Ltd. Liab. Co. Agreement, CAT NMS, LLC (Nov. 29, 2016), http://
www.catnmsplan.com/web/groups/catnms/@catnms/documents/appsupportdocs/cat_nms_
plan_amended_to_include_miax_pearl_executed.pdf.  These figures, however, ignore the
costs borne by industry participants as they create internal systems to comply with their new
CAT reporting obligations. See Dan Ryan, Consolidated Audit Trail: The CAT’s Out of the
Bag, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (July 16,
2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/16/consolidated-audit-trail-the-cats-out-of-
the-bag/.
108. See Tara E. Levens, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High-Frequency Trading and Securi-
ties Class Actions, U. CHI. L. REV. 1511, 1526-55 (describing the securities-fraud class action
framework as applied to HFT manipulation cases).  For examples of prominent class actions
in this area, see Complaint, Providence v. BATS Global Markets, Inc., No. 14-2811 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Apr. 18, 2014) (highlighting claims of manipulative and deceptive conduct in connection
with HFT strategies, including electronic front running, spoofing, layering, and rebate arbi-
trage); Complaint, Lanier v. BATS Exch., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) aff’d 838
F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2016) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Regula-
tion NMS obligates exchanges to send quote data to SIP no later than to direct feed subscrib-
ers, but does not require that direct feed and SIP subscribers receive data at same time).
109. Press Release, SEC, SEC Launches Market Structure and Data Analysis Website
(Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539865 877.
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market events and detect troublesome or illegal trading behavior.110  The
SEC regularly posts visual summaries of this market data on its website,
making markets seem less opaque to investors.111
The SEC has also made strides towards addressing the “two-tiered”
market concern.  In 2010, for example, the agency essentially prohibited
“naked access”, which refers to the practice of an HFT firm paying an
SEC-registered broker to directly access securities exchanges through
their order management systems.112  These systems had direct connections
to exchanges and other trading platforms.  By accessing these systems,
HFT firms could reduce their trade latency and increase the efficacy of
their trade strategies without submitting themselves to various risk-man-
agement and capital requirements faced by registered brokers.  The Naked
Access Rule prohibited broker-dealers from providing this access, and re-
quired brokers with market access to put in place risk management con-
trols and supervisory procedures to help prevent erroneous orders, ensure
compliance with regulatory requirements, and enforce pre-set credit or
capital thresholds.113
Meanwhile, many of the SEC’s enforcement efforts have aimed to in-
crease investor knowledge about how secondary markets work.  For exam-
ple, the SEC fined Direct Edge for selectively disclosing information
about how a certain order type commonly used by HFT firms operated to
its members.114  In its enforcement action, the SEC indicated that many
HFT firms gave Direct Edge input regarding how these orders should op-
erate, and stated that Direct Edge should have informed its members of
this fact.115  In response, exchanges have taken steps to eliminate or sim-
plify their order types, presumably to make their platforms seem less bi-
ased towards HFT traders.116
In short, the SEC has taken many positive steps towards developing a
more robust market regulatory infrastructure.  HFT registration will pro-
mote transparency while CAT, MIDAS, and similar programs will give the
SEC dramatically better surveillance capabilities.  Using these tools, the
SEC can better parse the harmful algorithms from the beneficial ones and
adjust their enforcement and policy focus accordingly.  Though other juris-
110. Frank Konkel, SEC’s MIDAS program highlights how to do big data, FCW (Mar.
28, 2014), https://fcw.com/articles/2014/03/28/sec-midas-big-data.aspx.
111. Id.
112. See Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with market Access, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-63241, 75 Fed. Reg. 69791 (Nov. 3, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-5).
113. Id.
114. EDGA Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 74032, 2015 WL 137640 (Jan. 12,
2015).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Adam Brown, NYSE to Eliminate Several Complex Order Types to Rein
in HFT, IR MAG. (May 9, 2014), http://www.irmagazine.com/articles/stock-exchanges-listings
/20178/nyse-eliminate-several-complex-order-types-rein-hft/.
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dictions have placed more emphasis on investor protection issues,117 there
is no immediate need in the United States to follow suit beyond ensuring
regulators implement and adhere to existing rules and proposals going for-
ward.  If anything, U.S. regulators should consider reevaluating trading
platform co-location and proprietary data feed distribution practices in the
medium-term.  Any benefit gained from changing either of these things,
however, would likely not come from equalized access to market data
(HFT firms would simply place more emphasis on improving their order
processing capabilities).  Instead, eliminating these practices would help
regulators dispel the public’s perception, right or wrong, that markets are
rigged.118
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF REGULATORY COORDINATION
Every day, secondary markets grow faster, more complex, and more
interconnected.  HFT’s ability to employ cross-exchange and cross-asset
arbitrage strategies means that trading is more impactful on a global scale
than ever before.  Global securities regulations have grown more interde-
pendent as well; issuers can cross-list their stocks on multiple exchanges
while HFT firms often locate themselves and operate in multiple markets.
Given HFT’s constant demand for access to new trading opportunities, it
is not surprising that exchanges have consolidated.  Revenues from equi-
ties trading have plunged in the face of fierce competition, pushing stock
exchanges to merge with derivatives and international exchanges to boost
growth.119  As one industry commentator opined, “[t]he way the market
works is simple: if you’re not in the top tier or in the second tier of [global]
exchanges, you’re finished.”120
Regulators have taken notice of these trends.  For instance, before the
Flash Crash, single-security circuit breakers were limited to particular ve-
nues or assets.  Once these circuit breakers were triggered, trading volume
could nonetheless migrate off-exchange or to other assets.  During the
Flash Crash, CME, a derivatives exchange, hit many of these circuit break-
ers while NYSE did not.  This meant that trading in certain derivatives
halted, but trading in their associated stocks remained active.  NYSE exe-
cuted open trades, but later canceled and reversed them.  However, orders
117. In Australia, regulators partially shift the surveillance onus to other traders.  Mar-
ket participants must notify its primary market regulator, the Australian Securities and In-
vestments Commission, if they have “reasonable grounds” to suspect that someone has
placed an order or engaged in a transaction that creates or maintains an artificial, false, or
misleading price. See Aust. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n, Regulatory Guide 238: Suspicious Activity
Reporting 6 (Aug. 2013), http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1247093/rg238.pdf.
118. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS 109 (2014).
119. See Eyk Henning & Shayndi Raice, NYSE Owner ICE, CME Group Mulling Bids
for LSE, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nyse-owner-intercontinent
al-exchange-says-it-is-considering-offer-for-lse-1456821176; Ken Sweet, Why Stock Ex-
changes Have Merger Fever, CNN MONEY (Feb. 18, 2011), http://money. cnn.com/2011/02/18/
markets/exchange_mergers/.
120. See Sweet, supra note 119.
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placed after trading resumed on CME, intended to hedge against their
perceived stock losses on NYSE, did execute.121  Paradoxically, these
hedge trades lost money.  Had both exchanges been subject to the circuit
breakers, this state of affairs would not have taken place.  Afterward, reg-
ulators revamped the circuit breaker system, and securities and futures
exchanges must now follow procedures for coordinated market-wide trad-
ing halts based on declines in the S&P 500 index.122  To facilitate more
measures like these, the CFTC and SEC formed a Joint Advisory Commit-
tee to consider potential coordinated regulatory responses.123  Both of the
agencies have either taken up or considered many of the committee’s
recommendations.124
Likewise, successful implementation of most policy measures discussed
in this article depends on significant regulatory coordination and coopera-
tion.  Rolling out on-demand batch auctions, for instance, requires regula-
tors and exchanges to work together to determine eligible securities and
traders.  Altering tick sizes, maker-taker fees, and order message limits
pose similar challenges.  And with respect to surveillance tools like CAT,
the SEC needs to collaborate with FINRA, broker-dealers, and traders to
ensure the data collected is the data desired.  Simply put, exchanges, regu-
lators, and traders all need to work together on an ongoing basis to ensure
these measures actually, and not just theoretically, improve market
conditions.
Cooperation must extend to the international level as well.  Inadequate
coordination could result in HFT firms pursuing yet another arbitrage
strategy, but this time of the regulatory variety.  Downward competitive
pressure from jurisdictions that want to attract or retain HFT’s order flows
might “enhance or debilitate [the] regulatory regime[s]” of other jurisdic-
tions, putting certain investment activity that has profound effects on a
given market beyond a state’s regulatory reach.125
These risks are most acute with respect to financial transaction taxes.
Even if these taxes are targeted and limited to aggressive trading strate-
gies, HFT firms could simply avoid the tax by relocating their operations
to another exchange in another jurisdiction.  For instance, when Sweden
began taxing financial transactions in the 1980s, bond trading fell by 85%
121. Ananth Madhavan, Exchange-Traded Funds, Market Structure, and the Flash
Crash, 68 FIN. ANALYSTS J., no. 4, 2012, at 20, 22.
122. SEC, Investor Bulletin: Measures to Address Market Volatility (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/circuitbreakersbulletin.htm.
123. JOINT CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, REC-
OMMENDATIONS REGARDING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6,
2010, at 2 (2010).
124. Id. at 3-14.
125. Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International  Securities Regulation
in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 563, 606-07 (1998).
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and futures trading fell by 98%.126  By 1990, more than 50% of all Swedish
trading moved to London.  More recently, Italy’s financial transaction tax
caused trading in Italian stocks to fall by 34.2% the year it introduced the
tax.127  While the Italian government expected to raise _1 billion via the
tax, actual receipts totaled only _200 million.128  Italian traders have felt
the effects: studies have found that volatility and bid-ask spreads signifi-
cantly increased.129
Regulators must carefully think through HFT registration require-
ments and market-making obligations for similar reasons.  If not imple-
mented in a coordinated way, these requirements risk alienating both
good and bad HFT, pushing both types to jurisdictions with more lenient
regulations and less probing registration requirements.130
Of course, regulatory coordination is not always easy or desirable.
Harmonizing HFT regulation on a global scale would be contentious and
likely impractical.  First, trying to universalize substantive regulation “can
quickly devolve into regulatory nationalism as internal political and eco-
nomic interests clash with international expectations.”131  Coordination
may also exacerbate transparency, accountability, and legitimacy issues to
the extent that international bodies not accountable to the subjects of the
regulation develop universal regulatory principles.132  Second, market
structures can vary dramatically across jurisdictions.  Rules established in
a country with a single trading venue, for instance, should not be the same
as those used in countries with highly fragmented markets.133  Third, har-
126. Financial Transaction Taxes are Historically Harmful and Unsuccessful, MODERN
MARKETS INITIATIVE, https://modernmarketsinitiative.org/topics/ftt/ (last visited Mar. 11,
2016).
127. FTT Drags Down Italian Stock Trading Volumes, FTSE GLOBAL MARKETS (Apr.
23, 2014), http://www.ftseglobalmarkets.com/news/ftt-drags-down-italian-stock-trading-
volumes.html.
128. Maria Coelho, Dodging Robin Hood: Responses to France and Italy’s Financial
Transaction Taxes, 31 (Nov. 3, 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California
at Berkeley), http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Events/conferen
ces/doctoral_meeting/2014/coelho.pdf.
129. See Tobias Ruhl & Michael Stein, The Impact of Financial Transaction Taxes: Evi-
dence from Italy, 34 ECON. BULLETIN 25, 32 (2014).
130. See Carol L. Clark, Controlling Risk in a Lightning-Speed Trading Environment,
CHICAGO FED LETTER, no. 272, March 2010, https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago
-fed-letter/2010/march-272. Several major U.S. HFT players have expanded their operations
to Europe, attracted by diverse trading opportunities, favorable corporate tax rates, and con-
venient regulatory requirements.  Fiona Reddan, Market Trading in a Flash, IRISH TIMES
(Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.irishtimes.com/business/market-trading-in-a-flash-1.749197.
131. Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 63, 66 (2014).
132. Kathleen Casey, Comm’r, SEC, The Role of International Regulatory Coopera-
tion and Coordination in Promoting Efficient Capital Markets, Address Before the Instituto
Bruno Leoni (June 12, 2010).
133. For example, the U.S. has 13 recognized exchanges and over 50 alternative trading
systems.  In contrast, 90% of trading activity in Japan occurs on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
See Yuji Nakamura & Toshiro Hasegawa, Humans Lose Out as Robots Take Tokyo Stock
Spring 2017] Implementing High Frequency Trading Regulation 229
monization efforts could create new arbitrage opportunities.  Since the
pace of enacting legal change will vary across countries, things might get
worse before they possibly get better.  Finally, uniform regulations risk the
converse problem of regulatory arbitrage since they could potentially in-
hibit regulatory competition and experimentation, leading to stale and in-
flexible rules that quickly become outdated.
Even after acknowledging these limits, there is room for at least some
level of international coordination.  Given the interconnectedness of mar-
kets, international securities regulators should consider (1) coordinating
their data-gathering and registration processes to better understand how
HFT strategies impact investors and global markets; (2) sharing this data
to enable quick and effective resolution of cross-border enforcement is-
sues and inform more consistent, high-quality regulations that minimize
potential regulatory gaps; and (3) undertaking synchronized responses to
severe secondary market disruptions which promote cross-market stability
and reduce systemic risk.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to public opinion, HFT is not a recent phenomenon. Elec-
tronic trading has been a fixture in markets since the 1960s, and HFT is
simply its latest incarnation.  Electronic trading arose out of a need to en-
hance secondary markets.  In many ways, it has—trading opportunities are
more diverse, spreads are lower, and price competition is at an all-time
high.  HFT, if properly managed, can propel these enhancements even fur-
ther.  Although HFT presents many logistical problems and poses signifi-
cant philosophical challenges to past market paradigms, it can still be a
force for good if utilized the right way.
Exchange, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-05/
robots-take-tokyo-as-high-frequency-equity-infiltration-hits-70-.
